સિવિલ કેસો ના ઝડપી નિવારણ માટે ની માર્ગદર્શિકા – સુપીમ કોર્ટ

Yashpal Jain vs Sushila Devi & Others CIVIL APPEAL NO.4296 OF 2023

યશપાલ જૈન વિ સુશીલા દેવી અને અન્ય લોકો સિવિલ અપીલ નંબર 4296 2023

ઓર્ડર

1. સિવિલ અપીલની મંજૂરી છે અને નૈનીતાલ ખાતે ઉત્તરાખંડની હાઈકોર્ટ દ્વારા 2013ની રિટ પિટિશન (M/S) નંબર 144 માં પસાર કરાયેલ તારીખ 28.11.2019 ના આદેશને બાજુ પર રાખવામાં આવ્યો છે અને ટ્રાયલ કોર્ટ દ્વારા 09.05.2012 ના રોજનો આદેશ પસાર કરવામાં આવ્યો છે. તારીખ 13.12.2012 ના 2012 ના સિવિલ રિવિઝન નંબર 4 માં પુષ્ટિ થયેલ છે.

2. નીચેના નિર્દેશો જારી કરવામાં આવ્યા છે:

i જિલ્લા અને તાલુકા સ્તરેની તમામ અદાલતોએ સમન્સનો યોગ્ય અમલ અને CPC ના ઓર્ડર V નિયમ (2) હેઠળ નિર્ધારિત સમયમર્યાદામાં સુનિશ્ચિત કરવો જોઈએ અને મુખ્ય જિલ્લા ન્યાયાધીશો દ્વારા તેનું નિરીક્ષણ કરવામાં આવશે અને આંકડા ભેગા કર્યા પછી તેઓ તેને આગળ મોકલશે. તેની વિચારણા અને દેખરેખ માટે હાઈકોર્ટ દ્વારા રચાયેલ સમિતિ સમક્ષ મૂકવામાં આવશે.

ii. જિલ્લા અને તાલુકા કક્ષાની તમામ અદાલતોએ સુનિશ્ચિત કરવું કે ઓર્ડર VIII નિયમ 1 હેઠળ નિર્ધારિત મર્યાદામાં અને પ્રાધાન્યરૂપે 30 દિવસની અંદર લેખિત નિવેદન દાખલ કરવામાં આવે અને શા માટે સમય મર્યાદા 30 દિવસથી વધુ લંબાવવામાં આવી રહી છે તે અંગે લેખિતમાં કારણો આપવા. CPC ના ઓર્ડર VIII ના પેટા-નિયમ (1) ની જોગવાઈ હેઠળ દર્શાવેલ છે.

iii જિલ્લાઓ અને તાલુકાઓની તમામ અદાલતો એ સુનિશ્ચિત કરશે કે દલીલો પૂર્ણ થયા પછી, પક્ષકારોને ઓર્ડર X માં દર્શાવ્યા મુજબ નક્કી કરેલા દિવસે હાજર થવા અને પ્રવેશ અને અસ્વીકાર રેકોર્ડ કરવા માટે બોલાવવામાં આવશે અને અદાલત દાવોના પક્ષકારોને પસંદ કરવા માટે નિર્દેશિત કરશે. કલમ 89 ની પેટા-કલમ (1) માં નિર્દિષ્ટ કર્યા મુજબ કોર્ટની બહાર સમાધાનની કોઈપણ પદ્ધતિ અને પક્ષકારોના વિકલ્પ પર આવા ફોરમ અથવા સત્તાધિકારી સમક્ષ હાજર થવાની તારીખ નક્કી કરવી જોઈએ અને પક્ષકારોમાંથી કોઈપણ એકને પસંદ કરે છે. પતાવટના નિર્દેશોની રીતો નિર્ધારિત તારીખ, સમય અને સ્થળ પર હાજર થવા માટે જારી કરવામાં આવશે અને પક્ષકારોએ આવા નિયુક્ત સ્થાન અને સમયે કોઈ વધુ સૂચના આપ્યા વિના આવી સત્તા/ફોરમ સમક્ષ હાજર થવું જોઈએ અને તે સંદર્ભ ક્રમમાં પણ સ્પષ્ટ કરવામાં આવશે કે અજમાયશ બે મહિનાની અવધિથી વધુ નક્કી કરવામાં આવે છે અને તે સ્પષ્ટ કરે છે કે ADR ફળદાયી ન હોવાના કિસ્સામાં, ટ્રાયલ બીજા દિવસે શરૂ થશે જેથી નિશ્ચિત છે અને રોજ-બ-રોજના ધોરણે આગળ વધશે.

iv કલમ 89(1) હેઠળ નિર્ધારિત કર્યા મુજબ એડીઆર એટલે કે વિવાદનું નિરાકરણ પસંદ કરવામાં પક્ષની નિષ્ફળતાના કિસ્સામાં અદાલતે ઓપન કોર્ટમાં પ્રાધાન્ય એક સપ્તાહની અંદર તેના નિર્ણય માટે મુદ્દાઓ તૈયાર કરવા જોઈએ.

vi જીલ્લા અને તાલુકા અદાલતોના વિદ્વાન ટ્રાયલ જજ શક્ય હોય ત્યાં સુધી ડાયરી જાળવશે તેની ખાતરી કરવા માટે કે ટ્રાયલ માટે કોઈપણ દિવસે હાથ ધરવામાં આવી શકે તેટલા જ કેસોની સંખ્યા અને પુરાવાના રેકોર્ડિંગ પૂર્ણ કરવા જેથી કેસોની ભીડ ટાળી શકાય અને તેના ક્રમને કારણે મુલતવી રાખવાની માંગણી કરવામાં આવશે અને તેના કારણે ટેકધારકોને થતી કોઈપણ અસુવિધા અટકાવવામાં આવશે.

vii પક્ષકારોનું પ્રતિનિધિત્વ કરતા સલાહકારો ઓર્ડર XI અને ઓર્ડર XII ની જોગવાઈઓથી માહિતગાર થઈ શકે છે જેથી વિવાદના અવકાશને સંકુચિત કરી શકાય અને તે બાર એસોસિએશન અને બાર કાઉન્સિલની પણ સમયાંતરે રિફ્રેશર કોર્સ અને પ્રાધાન્ય વર્ચ્યુઅલ દ્વારા કરાવવાની ભારે જવાબદારી હશે. મોડ

viii ટ્રાયલ કોર્ટો સાવચેતીપૂર્વક, સાવચેતીપૂર્વક અને નિષ્ફળતા વિના ઓર્ડર XVII ના નિયમ 1 ની જોગવાઈઓનું પાલન કરશે અને એકવાર ટ્રાયલ શરૂ થઈ જાય પછી તે નિયમ (2) ની જોગવાઈ હેઠળ વિચારણા મુજબ દરરોજ આગળ વધશે.

ix અદાલતો એ સુનિશ્ચિત કરવા માટે ખર્ચની ચૂકવણી માટેની જોગવાઈઓને અર્થપૂર્ણ અસર કરશે કે મુકદ્દમાની વિલંબ માટે કોઈ સ્થગિતતા માંગવામાં ન આવે અને આવી સ્થગિતતા મંજૂર કરવામાં આવે તો સામે પક્ષકારને યોગ્ય વળતર આપવામાં આવે .

v. ટ્રાયલની તારીખ નક્કી કરવી એ પક્ષકારો માટે હાજર રહેલા વિદ્વાન વકીલો સાથે પરામર્શમાં રહેશે જેથી તેઓ તેમના કેલેન્ડરને સમાયોજિત કરી શકે. એકવાર અજમાયશની તારીખ નક્કી થઈ જાય પછી, ટ્રાયલ શક્ય તેટલી હદે, રોજ-બ-રોજના આધારે આગળ વધવી જોઈએ.

x ટ્રાયલના અંતે મૌખિક દલીલો તાત્કાલિક અને સતત સાંભળવામાં આવશે અને CPC ના ઓર્ડર XX હેઠળ નિર્ધારિત સમયગાળાની અંદર ચુકાદો જાહેર કરવામાં આવશે.

xi દરેક કોર્ટમાં 5 વર્ષથી વધુ સમયના પેન્ડિંગ કેસોના આંકડા દરેક પ્રિસાઇડિંગ ઓફિસર દ્વારા મહિનામાં એક વાર પ્રિન્સિપલ ડિસ્ટ્રિક્ટ જજને મોકલવામાં આવશે જેઓ (પ્રિન્સિપલ ડિસ્ટ્રિક્ટ જજ/ડિસ્ટ્રિક્ટ જજ) તેને ભેગા કરીને રચાયેલી સમીક્ષા સમિતિને મોકલશે. સંબંધિત ઉચ્ચ અદાલતો દ્વારા તેને વધુ પગલાં લેવા સક્ષમ બનાવવા માટે .

xii સંબંધિત રાજ્યોના માનનીય મુખ્ય ન્યાયાધીશ દ્વારા રચવામાં આવેલી સમિતિ બે મહિનામાં ઓછામાં ઓછી એક વખત બેઠક કરશે અને સંબંધિત કોર્ટ દ્વારા યોગ્ય માનવામાં આવે તેવા સુધારાત્મક પગલાં લેવાનો નિર્દેશ કરશે અને જૂના કેસોનું પણ નિરીક્ષણ કરશે (પ્રાધાન્યમાં જે પેન્ડિંગ છે. 05 વર્ષથી વધુ) સતત.

એ પણ સ્પષ્ટ કરવામાં આવે છે કે ઉપરોક્ત નિર્દેશોના અમલીકરણ માટેના વધુ નિર્દેશો સમયાંતરે, જો જરૂરી હોય તો, અને આ કોર્ટ દ્વારા નિર્દેશિત કરવામાં આવશે.

ORDER

1. Civil Appeal is allowed and the order dated 28.11.2019 passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 by High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital is set aside and the order dated 09.05.2012 passed by the Trial Court as affirmed in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 dated 13.12.2012 stands affirmed.

2. The following directions are issued:

i. All courts at district and taluka levels shall ensure proper execution of the summons and in a time bound manner as prescribed under Order V Rule (2) of CPC and same shall be monitored by Principal District Judges and after collating the statistics they shall forward the same to be placed before the committee constituted by the High Court for its consideration and monitoring.

ii. All courts at District and Taluka level shall ensure that written statement is filed within the prescribed limit namely as prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 and preferably within 30 days and to assign reasons in writing as to why the time limit is being extended beyond 30 days as indicated under proviso to sub-Rule (1) of Order VIII of CPC.

iii. All courts at Districts and Talukas shall ensure after the pleadings are complete, the parties should be called upon to appear on the day fixed as indicated in Order X and record the admissions and denials and the court shall direct the parties to the suit to opt for either mode of the settlement outside the court as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section 89 and at the option of the parties shall fix the date of appearance before such forum or authority and in the event of the parties opting to any one of the modes of settlement directions be issued to appear on the date, time and venue fixed and the parties shall so appear before such authority/forum without any further notice at such designated place and time and it shall also be made clear in the reference order that trial is fixed beyond the period of two months making it clear that in the event of ADR not being fruitful, the trial would commence on the next day so fixed and would proceed on day-to-day basis.

iv. In the event of the party’s failure to opt for ADR namely resolution of dispute as prescribed under Section 89(1) the court should frame the issues for its determination within one week preferably, in the open court.

v. Fixing of the date of trial shall be in consultation with the learned advocates appearing for the parties to enable them to adjust their calendar. Once the date of trial is fixed, the trial should proceed accordingly to the extent possible, on day-to-day basis.

vi. Learned trial judges of District and Taluka Courts shall as far as possible maintain the diary for ensuring that only such number of cases as can be handled on any given day for trial and complete the recording of evidence so as to avoid overcrowding of the cases and as a sequence of it would result in adjournment being sought and thereby preventing any inconvenience being caused to the takeholders.

vii. The counsels representing the parties may be enlightened of the provisions of Order XI and Order XII so as to narrow down the scope of dispute and it would be also the onerous responsibility of the Bar Associations and Bar Councils to have periodical refresher courses and preferably by virtual mode.

viii. The trial courts shall scrupulously, meticulously and without fail comply with the provisions of Rule 1 of Order XVII and once the trial has commenced it shall be proceeded from day to day as contemplated under the proviso to Rule (2)

ix. The courts shall give meaningful effect to the provisions for payment of cost for ensuring that no adjournment is sought for procrastination of the litigation and the opposite party is suitably compensated in the event of such adjournment is being granted.

x. At conclusion of trial the oral arguments shall be heard immediately and continuously and judgment be pronounced within the period stipulated under Order XX of CPC.

xi. The statistics relating to the cases pending in each court beyond 5 years shall be forwarded by every presiding officer to the Principal District Judge once in a month who (Principal District Judge/District Judge) shall collate the same and forward it to the review committee constituted by the respective High Courts for enabling it to take further steps.

xii. The Committee so constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the respective States shall meet at least once in two months and direct such corrective measures to be taken by concerned court as deemed fit and shall also monitor the old cases (preferably which are pending for more than 05 years) constantly.

It is also made clear that further directions for implementation of the above directions would be issued from time to time, if necessary,and as may be directed by this Court.

=====FULL JUDGEMENT ========

2023 INSC 948 

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REPORTABLE 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.4296 OF 2023  

Yashpal Jain …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS 

Sushila Devi & Others …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T 

Aravind Kumar, J. 

PREFACE 

1. Even after 41 years, the parties to this lis are still groping in the  dark and litigating as to who should be brought on record as legal  representative of the sole plaintiff Mrs. Urmila Devi (hereinafter  referred to as ‘Urmila Devi’ for the sake of brevity). This is a classic 

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case and a mirror to the fact that litigant public may become  disillusioned with judicial processes due to inordinate delay in the legal  proceedings, not reaching its logical end, and moving at a snail’s pace due to dilatory tactics adopted by one or the other party. The said suit, OS No.2 of 1982, was instituted for the relief to declare the sale deed,  executed by Shri Mangal Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘first  defendant’ for the sake of convenience) in favour of defendants No.4  to 32 in respect of the suit properties described in the plaints schedule  as item No.1 to 8, to be null and void by claiming to be the owner of  the said properties; and for a decree of possession of the suit properties with costs. 

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: 

2. When the aforesaid suit was still at infancy stage the sole plaintiff expired on 18.05.2007. One Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an  application to substitute him as her legal heir, by placing reliance on  the Will dated 19.05.1999 and claiming to be a legatee under the said  registered Will. He also filed an affidavit stating thereunder that Mr.  Yashpal Jain (hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant’ for the sake of  convenience) was a witness to the said registered Will. The defendants

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objected to the said application contending inter alia that the appellant herein was the adopted son of late Urmila Devi by relying upon the  adoption deed dated 06.01.1973 duly registered in the office of the  Sub-Registrar. In the said proceedings, the present appellant also filed  an affidavit stating thereunder that he was a witness to the Will dated  19.05.1999 executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain.  The application filed by Manoj Kumar Jain came to be allowed by  order dated 24.02.2010.  

2.1 Being aggrieved by the said Order the legal heirs of the first  defendant namely, legal heirs of Mangal Singh, filed a Civil Revision No.2 of 2010 before the District Judge which came to be allowed by  setting aside the Order of the Trial Court on the ground that applicant  had stated during the course of the revisional proceedings that he would  not press the said application and as such directed the Trial Court to  consider the application filed by Yashpal Jain-appellant herein and  permitted him to file an application seeking condonation of delay along 

with the application to bring on record the legal representatives of the sole plaintiff, since he had failed to do so earlier. Accordingly, revision  application came to be allowed by order dated 02.12.2011 and Mr. 

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Yashpal Jain filed an application before the Trial Court for condoning  the delay in filing such application and also prayed for abatement of  suit to be set aside. The learned Trial Judge vide Order dated  09.05.2012 allowed the application by setting aside the abatement and  permitted Yashpal Jain to be substituted as legal representative of late  Urmila Devi. 

3. At this juncture, we would like to point out that a careful  perusal of the application and the orders passed by the courts below  would indicate that the parties and the courts below seem to have  proceeded on the footing that they were to adjudicate the rights of a  legal heir which if seen in the light of expression used in the Code of  Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) is impermissible, as  it is not referable to ‘legal heir’ but ‘legal representative’ as defined  under Section 2 (11) which reads: 

“Legal representative” means a person who in law  

represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any  

person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and  

where a party sues or is sued in a representative character  

the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the  

party so suing or sued. 

On the death of a party to the suit it is the legal representative who  is/are entitled to prosecute the proceedings and, in law, represent the 

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estate of the deceased. The legal representative who is brought on  record not only includes a legatee under a Will but also an intermeddler of the property who would be entitled to sue and to be sued and/or continue to prosecute the proceedings. This vital aspect seems to have  been lost sight of by the courts below conveniently. 

4. Be that as it may, the aforesaid Urmila Devi who claimed to be  Bhumidar and owner in possession of land situated in village  Sonargaon, Patti Katulsyun, District Garhwal, Uttarakhand has  contended in her suit that the suit schedule properties were looked  after by Mangal Singh- the first defendant and as he had fraudulently  obtained a Bhumidar Sanad of the land comprising No.77, 3/16 Nalis, she had filed an application under Section 137-A of UP Act No.1 of  1951 before the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri Garhwal,  challenging the said Bhumidari Sanad obtained by the first defendant,  which was held in her favour by the Tehsildar, and confirmed by the  appellate authority. Not being satisfied with the said order, the first  defendant had filed a second appeal before the Revenue Board which  came to be allowed in favour of Mangal Singh, against which a review  petition was filed thereon by Urmila Devi which came to be allowed  on 30.08.1982. The said order was challenged before the High Court 

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of Uttarakhand in Writ Petition (M/S) No.342 of 2005 (old No.14655  of 1983) by Mangal Singh. In the said proceedings a substitution application came to be filed by the legal representative of Mangal  Singh stating thereunder that Yashpal Jain (appellant herein) is the  legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and prayed for his name  to be substituted. The said application came to be allowed vide order  dated 24.02.2012 and appellant herein was substituted as the legal  representative of Urmila Devi in writ proceedings. There is no further  challenge to said order or in other words, it has attained finality. 

5. As already noticed hereinabove, appellant herein filed an  application for substitution as legal representative of the original  plaintiff-Urmila Devi along with an application for condoning the  delay in filing said application and to set aside the abatement. The said  application came to be allowed vide Order dated 09.05.2012. Being  aggrieved by the said order, the Legal Representatives of Mangal Singh  filed Civil Revision No.4 of 2012 before the District Judge who  affirmed the Order of the Trial Court and dismissed the Revision  Petition by Order dated 13.12.2012. The legal representatives of  Mangal Singh filed WP No.144 of 2013 before the High Court  challenging the Orders dated 09.05.2012 and 13.12.2012 passed by the 

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Trial Court and the Revisional Court, respectively. The High Court  allowed the writ petition by quashing the impugned orders and  rejecting the application of the appellant herein, thereby restoring the  original order dated 17.05.2008 wherein Manoj Jain had been ordered  for being substituted as legal representative of late Urmila Devi on the  strength of the registered Will dated 19.05.1999 propounded by him  with a direction to conclude the proceedings within a period of 9  months. Being aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been  filed. 

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES 

6. We have heard the arguments of Ms. Rachna Srivastava,  learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant and Mr.  Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel, appearing for the  respondents. 

7. It is the contention of Ms. Rachna Srivastava, learned Senior  Advocate appearing for the appellant, that the High Court committed a serious error in upsetting the findings of the Trial Court and the  Revisional Court whereunder the discretionary power was exercised by condoning the delay while setting aside the abatement and 

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allowing the application of the appellant herein to be brought on  record as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi; the High  Court erred in not considering the fact that courts below had recorded  a clear finding that appellant herein was the sole surviving legal 

representative of the deceased plaintiff and as such it ought not to  have interfered with the well-reasoned order passed by the Trial  Court as affirmed by the Revisional Court; She would also contend  that defendants in this suit who were the writ petitioners in WP(M/S)  342 of 2005 (old number 14655 of 1983) had substituted the appellant herein as legal representative of Urmila Devi in dispute  related to the suit schedule property (involved in OS No.2 of 1982) 

and as such defendants cannot be permitted to take stand contrary to  same. Hence, it is contended that impugned order is liable to be set  aside.  

8. Per contra, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel  appearing for the respondents, supports the impugned order and  contends that in the Writ Petition No.144 of 2013, appellant herein  who was a party therein had not filed a counter-affidavit and as such  High Court had recorded that non-traversing of petition averments would amount to admission and had also taken note of the fact that

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appellant herein had filed an affidavit before the Trial Court on  25.10.2008 whereunder he has accepted the Will dated 19.05.1999  executed by deceased Urmila Devi and thereby supported the stand of Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal heir of Urmila Devi. He would also  draw the attention of this Court to yet another affidavit dated  21.08.2009 filed by the appellant himself in OS No.2 of 1982  whereunder he has again supported the Will dated 19.05.1999 or in  other words, supported the substitution of Shri Manoj Kumar Jain as  legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. Hence, he contends  there is no illegality committed by the High Court. It is further  contended that appellant was having knowledge of OS No.2 of 1982  and as such he cannot plead ignorance for the delay. Lastly, challenging the adoption on the ground that same cannot be the basis for the appellant herein to be brought on record, he has sought for  rejection of this appeal. 

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION 

9. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and  after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival 

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contentions raised at the Bar, we are of the considered view that  following points would arise for our consideration: 

(i) Whether the impugned order dated 28.11.2019  

passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 quashing the  

orders dated 13.12.2012 rendered in Civil Revision No.4 of  

2012 by the High Court whereby the order dated 09.05.2012 

passed by trial court allowing the impleadment application  

filed by the appellant herein had been rejected, is to be  

sustained or set aside? 

(ii) Whether any further direction or directions requires  

to be issued for concluding the proceedings in a time bound  

manner on account of Suit No.2 of 1985 pending for trial for 

past 41 years? 

(iii) What order? 

RE: POINT No.(i) 

10. It is not in dispute that Smt. Urmila Devi had instituted a suit O.S. No.2 of 1982 against Mangal Singh and others in respect of suit  schedule properties as described in the plaint schedule for declaring the  sale deeds executed by Mangal Singh in favour of defendant Nos.4 to  32, as mentioned in Plaint Schedule 1 to 18, as null and void; and  during the pendency of the said suit the plaintiff- Smt. Urmila Devi  expired on 18.05.2007. On her demise Mr. Manoj Kumar Jain filed an  application on 17.05.2008 for substitution as her legal heir and  claiming right legatee under the Will dated 19.05.1999. This  application was followed by an affidavit of the appellant (Yashpal Jain) 

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dated 25.10.2008 stating thereunder that his mother Urmila Devi had  executed a Will dated 19.05.1999 in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain and  also stating thereunder that Will was duly registered. The legal heirs of  the defendant objected the said substitution contending, inter alia, that  the present appellant is the adopted son of Urmila Devi and said adoption deed was duly registered on 06.01.1973 in the office of the  Sub-Registrar. It was also contended that Shri Rajendra Prasad Jain  was the holder of power of attorney of Urmila Devi and on his 

(Rajendra Prasad) death on 18.02.2001, she had executed another  power of attorney on 21.04.2001 appointing Virender Kumar Jain and  on the basis of the same the name of his wife came to be mutated in  respect of the lands indicated thereunder. Hence, it was contended that  Will propounded by Manoj Kumar Jain was fabricated and forged.  Hence, it was prayed that claim of Manoj Kumar Jain for being  substituted as legal representative of Urmila Devi is liable to be rejected. Yet another affidavit was also filed by the appellant on  21.08.2009 reiterating the contents of the earlier affidavit dated  25.10.2008. In other words, it was contended that Manoj Kumar Jain  was not the legal representative of Urmila Devi.

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11. The learned trial judge allowed the application by order dated  24.02.2010 for substitution by condoning the delay with costs and  directed substitution of Manoj Kumar to be the legal representative of  deceased plaintiff Urmila Devi. 

12. The aforestated order dated 24.02.2010 came to be challenged by legal representatives of Mangal Singh in Civil Revision No.2 of  2010 which resulted in same being allowed vide order dated  02.12.2011 and the order of the trial court dated 24.02.2010 was set  aside by taking note of the fact that Manoj Kumar Jain had stated in  his application 27/C along with affidavit that he would not press the  substitution application. The appellant was granted liberty to file an  application for impleadment as a party before the lower court. In this  background appellant herein filed an application for substitution as  legal representative of Urmila Devi and this application came to be  filed on 05.12.2011 along with application for condonation of delay and to set aside abatement, which was opposed by the legal  representatives of the first defendants by filing objections and  contending that application filed by Yashpal Jain is not maintainable. 

After hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties learned  trial judge by a detailed order dated 09.05.2012 condoned the delay 

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and allowed the application of the appellant to be brought on record as  legal representative of the deceased-plaintiff Urmila Devi. This order  came to be affirmed by order dated 13.12.2012 in Civil Revision No.4  of 2012 filed by the legal representatives of Mangal Singh. 

13. It is pertinent to mention at this juncture that during the life  time of Urmila Devi an application came to be filed under Section 137- A of U.P. Act No.1 of 1951 before Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, Pauri  Garhwal contending that the Bhumidari Sanad had been obtained by  Mangal Singh, with reference to land comprising Nos.77, 3/16 Nalis, 

by adopting forgery, which came to be accepted. The appeal filed by Mangal Singh before the Assistant Collector against the order of  Tehsildar did not yield any result, which gave rise to filing of a Second  Appeal before the Revenue Board culminating in said appeal being  allowed in favour of Mangal Singh. The Review Petition filed against  the order of the Second Appellate Authority came to be allowed and  this was challenged by Mangal Singh in WP (M/S) No.342 of 2005  (Old No.14655 of 1983). During the pendency of the said writ  petition, as noticed earlier, Urmila Devi expired and an application for  substitution came to be filed by the very same legal representatives of  Mangal Singh (who are Respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein) vide Annexure 

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P-10, specially pleading thereunder to delete the name of Respondent  No.4 (therein) Smt. Urmila Devi and substitute Yashpal Jain  (appellant herein) in her place. This application came to be allowed by  order dated 24.02.2012 as reflected in Annexure RA/2 annexed to the  rejoinder affidavit of the appellant. In this view of the matter, it cannot  be gain said by the respondents herein that the appellant is not to be  substituted as legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi. It is for  this cogent reason, the learned trial judge vide order dated 09.05.2012  allowed the substitution and permitted the appellant herein to be  substituted as legal representative of deceased plaintiff-Urmila Devi.  Rightly so, this order of the trial court came to be affirmed by the  Revisional Court vide order dated 13.12.2012. It would be apt and  appropriate to note at this juncture and at the cost of repetition that  Manoj Kumar Jain, who had initially filed an application for  substitution which came to be allowed by the trial court by order dated 24.02.2010, which order was carried in Civil Revision No.2 of 2010  and in the said proceedings an application came to be filed by said  Manoj Kumar Jain stating thereunder that he does not intend to press  the application filed by him for being substituted as legal  representative of Urmila Devi. This fact also persuaded the Revisional 

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Court to remand the matter back to the trial court vide order dated  02.12.2011.  

14. In this factual scenario, the defendants cannot be heard to  contend that appellant herein had filed two affidavits (Annexure P-5  and Annexure P-7) whereunder he had admitted Manoj Kumar Jain as  the legal representative of deceased Urmila Devi and as such he cannot  turn around to assert himself to be the legal representative of Urmila  Devi, for the simple reason that affidavits filed by the appellant  Yashpal Jain does not even remotely suggest or indicate that he have admitted Manoj Kumar Jain being the legal representative of Urmila  Devi. On the other hand, said affidavits which has been perused by  us, would clearly indicate that he has only affirmed and reiterated the  fact that he is a signatory to the said Will and nothing more or nothing  less. 

15. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, learned counsel appearing for  the respondents herein, have also contended that on account of non traversing of the writ petition averments the contents thereof are to be  presumed true and correct, though seems to be an attractive proposition at first brush, it cannot be accepted for the simple reason 

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that consent does not confer jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the records  would clearly indicate that Manoj Kumar Jain himself had filed an  application, accompanied by affidavit before the Revisional Court in  Civil Revision No.2 of 2010, stating thereunder that he would not  press the application filed by him for substitution and this was  sufficient for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant or in other words, it should have sustained the order of trial court and  ordered for appellant being brought on record as legal representative  of deceased Urmila Devi. 

16. At the cost of repetition, it requires to be noticed that  respondents herein themselves having filed an application in WP  (M/S) No.342 of 2005 for bringing the present appellant (Yashpal  Jain) as her legal representative in the writ petition (M/S) 342/2005 and prosecuted the same, would reflect that they were in the  acquaintance of the fact that present appellant being the legal  representative of deceased Urmila Devi but yet are attempting to  contend that Manoj Kumar Jain is to be brought on record as legal  representative of Urmila Devi. In this background the impugned order  which has resulted in rejection of the application filed by the appellant  to be brought on record as legal representative of Urmila Devi if 

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sustained would result in the estate of deceased plaintiff not being  represented, as a consequence of which suit would abate or would be  put to a silent death by the defendants without claim made in the suit  being adjudicated on merits. Hence, point No.(i) is answered in favour  of the appellant and against respondents and therefore, the impugned  order is set aside. 

17. As far as the question of right of the appellant over the suit  schedule properties, we are of the view, by virtue of adoption propounded, it is an issue which would be at large before the learned  trial court and the veracity of the Will dated 19.05.1999 alleged to  have been executed by Urmila Devi in favour of Manoj Kumar Jain, is to be decided in appropriate proceedings and as such we desist from  expressing any opinion in that regard and contentions of both parties  are kept open.  

RE: POINT No.(ii) 

18. Case papers on hand would disclose that dispute between the  parties relates back to 02.02.1982 the date of institution of the suit  No.2/1982 by the original plaintiff Smt. Urmila Devi. As to the stage  of the suit namely, as to whether trial has commenced or otherwise,

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the material available before this court are silent but the fact remains  that proceedings have got protracted from 1982 till demise of Urmila  Devi on 18.05.2007 and thereafter it has moved at a snail’s pace or in other words, the litigation seems to have not been taken to its logical  end for reasons best known. The death of the original plaintiff opened  up a flood of litigation and as a result of it, several orders came to be 

passed by the courts below, both in original jurisdiction and revisional  jurisdiction, which also reached the High Cout and ultimately before this Court by the present proceedings. The cause for delay has been myriad. It is for this reason we have expressed our anguish at the  beginning of this judgment as to likelihood of litigant public getting disillusioned of justice delivery system due to delays. It would be apt  to note that certain litigations initiated more than 50 years back are still  pending. As per the data extracted from National Judicial Data Grid  (NJGD), we have noted hereinbelow the three oldest civil and criminal  cases: 

TOP 3 PENDING CIVIL CASES 

1. West Bengal 

(a) Civil Judge Senior Division, Malda – Partition Suit  No.30 of 1952 – registered on 04.04.1952

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(b) Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Medinipur – Other Suit  No.39 of 2017 -registered on 15.09.1953. 

2. Uttar Pradesh 

Civil Judge, Junior Division, Varanasi – Original Suit  No.319 of 1953 – registered on 02.07.1953 

TOP 3 PENDING CTRIMINAL CASES 

(1) Maharashtra 

(a) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.2319  of 1959 – registered on 11.04.1959 

(b) CJJD & JMFC Mehkar – R.C.C. No.61 of 1960 – registered on 06.10.1959 

(c) Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati – R.C.C. No.778 of  1961 – registered on 30.08.1961 

The Underlying factors behind Judicial Delays 

19. The causes of delay are numerous loopholes in the law itself,  redundant and voluminous paper work, absence of the witnesses,  adjournments sought and granted for no justifiable reason as also delay  in service of summons, lack of implementation of the provisions of  Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and Code 

20 

of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’), as the case  may be. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive. It is not that  there has been any lack of effort to speed up the Justice Delivery  System. However, the attempts made hitherto have yielded limited  results. Time and again various provisions of C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. have  been amended to cater the ever-increasing demands for speedy  disposal of cases and the results are not inspiring. There is an urgent  need to take pro-active steps to not only clear the huge backlog of cases  at all levels but there should be introspection by all the stakeholders to  gear up to meet the aspirations of the litigant public who would only  seek for speedy justice and to curtail the methods adopted to delay the  proceedings which may suit certain section or class of the litigant  public. When millions of consumers of justice file their cases by  knocking at the doors of the courts of first instance, they expect speedy  justice. Thus, an onerous responsibility vests on all stakeholders to  ensure that the people’s faith in this system is not eroded on account  of delayed justice. It is imperative to note that about 6 per cent of the  population in India is affected by litigation, in such a scenario the  courts would play an important role in the life of a nation governed  by Rule of Law. Peace and Tranquility in the society and harmonious 

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relationship between the citizens are achieved on account of effective  administration of justice and its delivery system, even the economic  growth of a country is dependent on the robust Justice Delivery  System which we have in our country. 

20. When the efficiency has become the hallmark of modern  civilization and in all spheres of life there is an urgent need to hasten the pace of delivery of justice by reducing the time period occupied by  the trial of suits and criminal proceedings as also the offshoots of such  litigation which results in revisions, appeals etc. arising out of them. 

A historical outlook of steps taken to curb the Judicial delay 

21. The issue of delay has been bothering all the stakeholders for ages. Way back in the year 1924, a committee was constituted known  as the Civil Justice Committee to enquire into the issues relating to  changes and improvements necessary to bring in “more speedy,  economical and satisfactory dispatch of the business transacted in the  courts” under the chairmanship of Justice Rankin. Delay in disposal of  cases beyond a period of two and a half years was a crucial concern  and it was emphasized by the said Committee that “where the arrears 

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are unmanageable, improvement in the methods can only palliate. It  cannot cure”.1 The Central Government under the chairmanship of  Justice S.R. Das set up a committee known as High Court Arrears  Committee in the year 1949. In 1979, the Law Commission of India in 

its 77th Report on ‘delay and arrear in trial courts’ observed that the  delay in civil or criminal matters have decreased the confidence among  the general public about the judicial system. It was emphasized that  civil cases should be treated as lapsed if the matter was not disposed  of within one year from the date of registration, whereas a criminal  matter should be disposed within six months and in case of sessions  trial it should not go beyond one year. It was also suggested to timely  fill up the vacancies, appoint additional and ad-hoc judges and  increase overall judicial strength. Some of the key recommendations  of the Committee were: 

“(i) Improvement of judicial system to meet modern  

requirement of society. 

(ii) Time for scrutiny of the cases should not take more than  

one week. 

(iii) Summons and notices should be attached with the plaint  

at the stage of filing, without stating the filing date.  

(iv) Procedural reforms in civil and criminal case  

proceedings.”  

1 Civil Justice Committee, 1924

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22. The 79th reports of the Law Commission of India pertains to  “Delay and Arrears in High Courts and Appellate Court” which  when read along with the 77th report as aforementioned, has provided  a step-by-step manual for managerial judging, prescribing upper time  limits for trial procedure to ensure speedy disposal of cases to be  followed by Trial Courts, High Courts, and other appellate courts. Its  recommendations range from ways in which judges should expedite  the service of summons to the drafting of the decree and includes the  suggestions that they should become more active in conciliation  efforts. Other notable recommendations include:  

“(i) Appointment of administrative justices who supervise the  work of process servers; 

(ii) Fixing of dates should be done by presiding officer and  not readers, cases should deliberately not be fixed when the  prospects of them being taken up for low and a standard of  number of cases pending before courts should be decided and  whenever there are indications that the number of cases will  go beyond the standard, additional courts should be set up.” 

23. The 120th Law Commission Report on ‘Manpower planning  in judiciary: a blueprint’ recommended that the most effective way to  overcome the heavy pendency of cases clogging on the judicial system  is by reducing judicial delay. It further states that the judiciary is  overburdened by large number of cases filed each year, which clog an 

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already stressed system. The report states that in 2002, when the ratio of the  judges to population was 13 judges to 10,00,000 people, the Supreme Court  recommended, in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India (2002) 4  SCC 247, to increase the ratio to at least 50 judges per 10,00,000 people. 

24. The Malimath Committee, constituted on Reforms of Criminal  Justice System, suggested multiple recommendations in its report, for  Criminal Justice System, however some of them can be applied even  in the civil litigation: 

1. Time limit for filing written statements, amendments of  pleadings, service of summons etc., must be prescribed. 

2. So far as possible, parties must endeavor to decide or to settle  the cases outside the court and to carry out the same objective,  Section 89 in CPC, was introduced. 

3. To record the evidences by issuing the Commission instead of  by presence before the court of law. For the purpose of the  same under Section 75 of the CPC, commission can be issued  for collecting evidence. 

4. Time frame need to be provided for oral argument before the  court of law. 

5. Restriction on Right of appeal.

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25. Similarly, the Delhi High Court undertook a pilot project titled  ‘‘Zero Pendency Court Project Report’2 whereunder 22 specific pilot  and reference courts were referred to collect data to examine  meticulously the life cycles of the legal cases. At its core, the project  sought to understand how the cases progressed through the legal  system in the absence of any backlog. The Data collected from the pilot  project led to suggestions of some major recommendations which  included, primarily, the assessment of Judicial strength, which as per  the report, is regarded as a vital attribute to the cause of delay. The  report in this regard suggested to arrive at an optimal judge strength to  handle cases pending in different court and went on to provide the Ideal  number of judges for different court. The report also highlighted that  in criminal cases, prosecution evidence hearings accounts for the  Highest percentage of court hearings however when it comes to  allocation of time, the courts tend to dedicate more minutes to final  arguments and the issuance of final orders. In civil cases,  miscellaneous hearings are common, but final order proceedings  

2 The Inspiration for the project was a remark by Justice M.N. Venkatachalaih (former  CJI) in a conversation with Justice Ravindra Bhat, one of the members of the State Court  Management System Committee (SCMS) of the Delhi HC.

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receive more time nevertheless, judges allocate a greater amount of  time to the final order or judgment hearings. 

26. Melvin M Belli, a member of the California Bar, in his article titled “The Law’s Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil  Litigation”, which was prepared as a project for the Belli society, has  noted “Trial delays or the period of the American Legal System”. The  backlog of the system has become so typical that a plaintiff has to wait  5 years for trial of a simple personal injury claimed. In case, if there  is an appeal, a final disposition of the case may occur 10 years after  plaintiff has been injured and the following factors were outlined as  the major contributors to the delay: 

(i) The inefficient management of the court system by the  

judiciary. 

(ii) A Tremendous increase in litigation. 

(iii) The philosophy of procrastination of many judges and  

lawyers, and 

(iv) The priority of criminal or civil cases on the court  

calendar. 

To tackle the aforesaid problems, the following remedial measures  were suggested as possible solutions: 

1) Appointment of surrogate judges (auditors, referees,  judges pro tempore) to handle certain cases. The idea of using  surrogate judges is to avoid unnecessary adjudication under  formal trials. This is followed in Massachusetts, where court  appointed auditors or referees, who were practicing attorneys,  used to adjudge motor vehicle tort cases. They report their 

27 

findings of facts and conclusions to the court and the parties may  accept the auditor’s report as final or request a trial. If the case  goes to trial, the auditor’s findings are prima facie evidence and  may be read to the jury. 

2) The imposition of interest accruing retroactively from  the time of incident, rather than from time of judgment, to  remove defendant’s incentives to delay.  

3) The elevation of civil cases to parity with criminal cases  so that civil cases will not be usurped. 

4) A requirement that judges set definite trial dates and  honor them, so that litigation cannot be delayed by one of the  attorneys. 

DELAY ON ACCOUNT OF PROCEDURAL LAWS 

27. At the outset, it is necessary to point out the reasons for delay  in civil trial namely: 

(i) Absence of strict compliance with the  provisions of CPC; 

(ii) Misuse of processes of the court;  

(iii) Lengthy/prolix evidence and arguments. Non utilization of provisions of the CPC namely  

Order X (examination of parties at the first  

hearing); 

(v) Non-Awarding of realistic cost for frivolous and  vexatious litigation; 

(vi) Lack of adequate training and appropriate  orientation course to judicial officers and  

lawyers;

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(vii) Lack of prioritization of cases;  

(viii) Lack of accountability and transparency. 

28. Apart from the above reasons, the other vital reasons include  the over-tolerant nature of the courts below while extending their olive  branch to grant adjournment at the drop of the hat and thereby bringing  the entire judicial process to a grinding halt. It is crucial to understand  that the wheels of justice must not merely turn, they must turn without  friction, without bringing it to a grinding halt due to unwarranted  delay. It is for such reasons that the system itself is being ridiculed not  only by the litigant public but also by the general public, thereby  showing signs of constant fear of delay in the minds of public which  might occur during the resolution of dispute, dissuading them from  knocking at the doors of justice. All the stakeholders of the system  have to be alive to this alarming situation and should thwart any attempt to pollute the stream of judicial process and same requires to  be dealt with iron hands and curbed by nipping them at the bud, as  otherwise the confidence of the public in the system would slowly be eroded. Be it the litigant public or Member of the Bar or anyone  connected in the process of dispensation of justice, should not be  allowed to dilute the judicial processes by delaying the said process by 

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in any manner whatsoever. As held by this Court in T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Another AIR (1977) 4 SCC 467 the answer to an  irresponsible suit or litigation would be a vigilant judge. This analogy  requires to be stretched in the instant case and to all the pending  matters by necessarily holding that every stakeholder in the process of  dispensation of justice is required to act swiftly, diligently, without  giving scope for any delay in dispensation of justice. Thus, an onerous  responsibility rests on the shoulders of the presiding officer of every  court, who should be cautious and vigilant against such indolent acts and persons who attempt to thwart quick dispensation of justice. A  response is expected from all parties involved, with a special emphasis  on the presiding officer. The presiding officer must exercise due  diligence to ensure that proceedings are conducted efficiently and  without unnecessary delays. While it’s important to maintain a friendly  and cooperative atmosphere with the members of the Bar, this should  not be misused as a pretext for frequent adjournment requests. A word  of caution to the learned members of the Bar, at this juncture, would  also be necessary because of they being considered as another wheel  of the chariot of dispensation of justice. They should be circumspect  in seeking adjournments, that too in old matters or matters which have 

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been pending for decades and desist from making request or prayer for  grant of adjournments for any reason whatsoever and should not take the goodness of the presiding officer as his/her weakness. 

29. In-fact, the utilization of the provision of CPC to the hilt  would reduce the delays. It is on account of non-application of many  provisions of the CPC by the presiding officers of the courts is one of  the reason or cause for delay in the proceedings or disputes not  reaching to its logical conclusion. 

30. The very fact of the pendency of the present suit No. 2 of 1982, in the instant case, for the past 41 years is reflective of the fact, as to  how some of the civil courts are functioning and also depicting how stakeholders are contributing to such delays either directly or  indirectly. The procedure that is being adopted by the courts below or  specifically the trial courts is contrary to the express provisions of the  CPC. It can also be noticed that there are party induced delays. It is  laid down under Orders VIII Rule (1) that a defendant shall at or  before the first hearing or within 30 days, or 90 days as the court may  permit, present a written statement of his defence. In most cases, there  would be no difficulty in presenting such a written statement on the  date fixed, and no adjournment should be given for the said purpose 

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except for a good cause shown, and in proper cases, costs should be  awarded to the opposite side, namely realistic costs. However, this is  seldom found. Delay in filing the written statement and seeking  adjournments is also another tactic used by the parties to litigation to  delay the proceedings No doubt in catena of judgments including  Kailash vs. Nanku 2005 (4) SCC 480, Serum Advocates Bar  Association, Tamil Nadu vs Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353.  Bharat Kalra vs. Raj Kishan Chhabra (2022) SCC OnLine SC 613 and Shoraj Singh vs Charan Singh (2018) SCC OnLine All 6613 the  time limit prescribed under the CPC has been held to be directory and  not mandatory which by itself does not mean that adjournments if  sought should be granted for mere asking. Only when such prayer  being honest and prayer sought with a bona-fide intention, which we  will have to be demonstrated in express terms, at least by way of an  affidavit, such prayers should be entertained as otherwise the purpose  of the legislative mandate would get defeated and the purpose of the  amendment brought to CPC by Act 22 of 2002 would also become  otiose. In other words, it is high time that the presiding officers of all  the trial courts across the country strictly enforce the time schedule  prescribed under sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Order VIII in its letter and 

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spirit rather than extending the olive branch on account of said  provision being held directory to its illogical end even where  circumstances of a particular case does not warrant time being  enlarged. Although Order XVII of the CPC indicate under the heading  “adjournments”, making it explicitly clear the procedure which  requires to be adopted by the civil courts in the matter of trial, as  evident from plain reading of the said provision would reveal, seems  to have been completely lost sight of by all the stakeholders, which  can be held as one of the root cause for delay in disposal of civil cases.  It would be apt and appropriate to extract Order XVII of the CPC and  it reads: 

ORDER XVII 

“1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing” (1) The  court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the  suit grant time to the parties or to any of them, and may from  time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit for reasons to be  recorded in writing: 

Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more  than three time to a party during hearing of the suit. 

(2) Costs of adjournment. -In every such case the Court  shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit, and 

[shall make such orders as to costs occasioned by the  adjournment or such higher costs as the court deems fit: 

Provided that, – 

(a) when the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be  continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in  attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that,  for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the 

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adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is  necessary. 

(b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party,  except where the circumstances are beyond the control of  that party, 

(c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another  Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment, 

(d) where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct  the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in  another Court, is put forward as a ground for adjournment,  the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied  that the party applying for adjournment could not have  engaged another pleader in time, 

(e) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his  pleader is not present or the party or his pleader, though  present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine  the witness, the Court may, if it thinks fit, record the  statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit  dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross 

examination of the witness, as the case may be, by the party  or his pleader not present or not ready as aforesaid.” 

 The High Court of Karnataka in the matter of M. Mahalingam  vs. Shashikala reported in ILR Karnataka 4055 had an occasion to  deal with this rule and it was observed as under: 

“17. The proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII was  introduced by the code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)  Rules, 1976. The object and reason behind the introduction  of this proviso was that, when hearing of evidence has once  begun such hearing shall be continued from day to day. The  said provision is being made more strict so that once such  stage is reached, an adjournment should be granted only for  unavoidable reasons. A few other restrictions were also  being imposed on the grant of adjournments. The intention  in enacting the said proviso is that, when the hearing of the  suit has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day,  until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined. In  other words, it provided that a suit being tried like a sessions

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case in a Criminal Court. Therefore, the Rule is, once trial  begins, evidence should be recorded on day-to-day basis.  Even in exceptional cases, if an adjournment becomes  necessary, it has to be adjourned to the following day only.  Clauses-(b) (c) and (d) were introduced restricting the power  of the Court to grant adjournments on the grounds set out  therein. These clauses make it clear that, the fact that a  pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, is not a  ground for adjournment. Even the illness of the pleader and  inability of a pleader to conduct a case is not a ground for  adjournment, unless the Court is satisfied that the party  applying for adjournment could not have engaged another  pleader in time. It also provides for the Court to record the  statement of witnesses who are present in Court, when the  party who summoned him and the party who has to cross examine, the said witnesses and their counsel being not  present Therefore, it is clear that the Court can be liberal in  granting adjournments before the commencement of the  Trial. But once the trial commences, there is an obligation  cast on the Court to conduct the said trial day-to-day until all  the witnesses in attendance have been examined.  Unfortunately, this procedure which is in the statute book  since 1976, is followed more in breach. Adjournments are  sought for and granted by the Courts as a matter of course.  The intention of the Parliament in enacting the said provision  was not appreciated. In spite of introduction of the proviso,  there was no marked change in the trial of suits.  Adjournments continued to dominate and obstruct speedy  trial. Therefore, the parliament amended the law once again  and now an attempt is made to control the power of the  courts in granting adjournments. 

18. This time sub-rule (1) and (2) of Rule 1 of Order XVII  was amended substantially by the code of Civil Procedure  (Amendment) Act, 1999. The object and reason behind the  amendment Act was that, every effort should be made to  expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings so that  justice may not be delayed. The committee on Subordinate  Legislation (11th Lok Sabha) recommended that it should be  made obligatory to record reasons for adjournment of cases  as well as award of actual or higher cost and not merely  notional cost against the parties seeking adjournment in  favour of the opposite party. Further limit up to three  adjournments has also been fixed in a case.

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19. The amended Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 provides that at any  stage of the suit, if sufficient cause is shown, the Court may  adjourn the hearing of the suit for the reasons to be recorded  in writing. Therefore, an adjournment cannot be granted for  a mere asking. There should be sufficient cause for such an  adjournment. Before granting adjournment, the Court has to  record in writing the reasons, which constituted sufficient  cause for it to adjourn the case. The proviso to sub-rule (1)  of Rule 1 puts an embargo on the Court’s power to grant  adjournments, in as much as, it restricts the said power to  grant adjournments to three times to a party during the  hearing of the suit. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise its  power of granting adjournments arbitrarily, whimsically and  it should know its limitations. The amendment to sub-rule  (2) of Rule 1 makes it obligatory on the part of the Court to  make an order as to costs occasioned by the adjournments.  This rule is intended to see that the imposition of costs may  act as a deterrent to the party seeking adjournment when  there being no sufficient cause. By such costs, the cost of  litigation would increase and it may dissuade the party from  seeking adjournment on flimsy grounds. 

20. In spite of the legislative mandate reflected in the  aforesaid provision, the Courts and the Lawyers continue to  ignore the said statutory provisions and the requirement of  holding a continuous trial day to day. The Courts, in practice,  have buried the rule fathoms deep and have been granting  adjournments on the flimsiest grounds. In every case these  provisions are honoured more in breach than in compliance  with the spirit of providing justice expeditiously. It is rare  indeed when a court holds a trial continuously in terms of  this rule. If only the provisions of the Code are followed in  letter and spirit, the grievance of delay in disposal of cases  would have been reduced considerably. The rule of law  requires respect for the law by all the citizens of this country.  The Judges and Lawyers who are the officers of the Court  are No. exception. First, they should respect the rule of law,  i.e., these statutory provisions. Without any exception they  cannot plead any difficulty in implementing these provisions  in letter and spirit. They are duty bound to act according to  these statutory provisions. Without doing what we are  legally expected to do, we are barking up at the wrong tree  and by this process we are deceiving ourselves. Any number of amendments to the Code or any efforts to reform the law  would have no effect, unless the Courts give effect to the  statutory provisions contained in the Code. If the Courts do 

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not implement the law, one cannot find fault with the  Advocates or the litigants. If these rules are implemented in  letter and spirit, it may lead to some inconvenience and  hardship as, for more than a century, the Judges, the lawyers  and litigants are used to a particular atmosphere in Court. It  is this atmosphere in Courts, which has no legal support and  is the cause for delay in disposal of cases. Therefore, it is  high time in the interest of speedy disposal of cases, these  rules are implemented; once implemented, in course of time,  lawyers and litigants would fall in line. 

In order to implement these statutory provisions as  amended, what is required is a change of mind set among the  Judges and they must have the courage to depart from the  practice which is in vogue. They must remind themselves  that till now these provisions are not followed and the  procedure which is adopted in Courts was totally different  from what is provided under the statute and thus has no legal  basis. That is the real cause for delay in disposal of cases.  Therefore, the need of the hour is a change of mental  attitude, firstly, on the part of the judges and secondly, on  the part of lawyers and litigants. A beginning has to be made.  It has to be done by Judges and Judges alone. In spite of the  criticism and the amendment to the law made by the  Parliament, if the Judges are not sensitive and do not give  effect to these provisions which are made with an avowed  object of speedy disposal of cases, the Judges would be  failing in their duty. Therefore, one may not blame the Code  for delay in disposal of cases. The delay is on account of not  following the provisions of the Code and in not knowing the  philosophy behind these statutory provisions. Even now it is  not too late for the Judges and Lawyers to give effect to the  statutory provisions and render speedy justice to the  litigants. Time has come that this malady should be treated  with even handed at all levels. 

21. In fact this view finds support from the observations  made by the Law Commission in the Reports on the Code of  Civil Procedure: 

“In the 14th Report of the Law Commission of India on  “Reform of Judicial Administration”, the Commission notes  with concern the failure of the Courts to appreciate that  Order 17 Rule 1 contemplates the continued hearing of a  case, once it has started, from day to day until it is finished.  It noted with concern that the judiciary seemed to think that  the interrupted hearings should be a rule and day to day  hearings the exception. Both the lawyers and the subordinate 

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judiciary still persist in floating these provisions by refusing  to have a continuous trial. 

27th Law Commission Report reads as under: “There is a popular belief that the technicalities of legal  procedure can be exploited and a case continued almost  indefinitely if so desired. In a weak case, apart from  numerous applications for adjournment, frivolous  interlocutory applications are made, e.g. applications for  amendment of the pleadings or for amendment of issues,  examination of witnesses on commission summoning  unnecessary witnesses etc., These tactics do not succeed  before an experienced and astute Judge. They succeed only  before Judges who have no adequate experience. And such  tactics succeed not because of the observance, but because  of the non-observance, of the rules of procedure. Delay  under this item is, therefore, not due to any defects in  procedure. Rules of procedure are intended to subserve and  not to delay or defeat justice.” 

22. Therefore, while considering the prayer for grant of  adjournment, it is necessary to keep in mind the legislative  intent. After the trial commences, the legislative mandate is,  it shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses  in attendance have been examined. Even to grant an  adjournment beyond the following day exceptional reasons  should exist and it should be recorded in writing before  adjourning the hearing beyond the following day. A reading  of the proviso makes it clear that the limitation of three  adjournments contained in proviso to sub-rule (1) apply  where adjournment is to be granted on account of  circumstances which are beyond the control of that party.  Even in cases which may not strictly fall within the category  of circumstances beyond the control of a party, the Court by  resorting to the provisions of higher cost which can also  include punitive cost grant adjournment beyond three times,  having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal  thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case and  compensate the party who is inconvenienced by such  adjournment. The said cost cannot be notional. It should be  realistic. As far as possible actual cost incurred by the other  party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to be  avoidable but is being granted on account of either  negligence or casual approach of a party or is being sought  to delay the progress of the ease. Therefore, an attempt is  made by the Parliament to enable the Court to have complete  control over the litigant and prevent parties from controlling 

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the course of the litigation. The whole object is to deter the  parties from seeking adjournment for the sake of mere  adjournment. If a party wants to have the luxury of an  adjournment, he should be made to pay for such luxury and  the opposite party who is inconvenienced is to be  compensated. In other words, the cost of litigation should be  made high in so far as a party who is not interested in speedy  trial. A person who wants to obstruct the course of justice,  delay the disposal of cases, abuse the process of court and  wants to harass his opponent by virtue of his money power,  for him the litigation should become costly which is not so  now. Therefore, this provision of imposition of cost to  prevent the litigant from seeking adjournment, thus, delay  the disposal of cases, is to be given full effect. It is a weapon  in the armory of the Judge to control the course of litigation  and expedite trial. In spite of this provision if the Judges do  not understand the significance and importance of these  amendments and allow the parties to control the course of  litigation, it only shows either lack of will on their part to  implement these statutory provisions or their inability to  give effect to these statutory provisions. 

23. When the litigants complain of delay in disposal of cases,  they cannot seek adjournments as a matter of right, as it is  against their interest. An adjournment at the instance of one  party, puts the other party to inconvenience, which in turn  gives rise to such complaints. But an adjournment may  become necessary for various reasons. Therefore, in such  circumstances it would be in the interest of justice to grant  adjournment, but at the same time the party inconvenienced  has to be duly compensated. It is in this background the  provision of Rule 1 of order XVII of CPC as amended has to  be understood and given effect to. A party to a litigation  cannot have any grievance for day-to-day trial and on the  contrary he should welcome it. It is only those litigants who  want to abuse the judicial process and wants to use this legal  machinery as a weapon of oppression against his opponents  can have any grievance. It is there, these amended provisions  come in handy to the courts to prevent such abuse of the  judicial process.

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The Case Flow Management System Rules: An  

Overlooked Lifesaver 

31. On the recommendation of this Court in ‘Salem Bar  Association vs. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 189=2003 (1) SCC 49 a  committee was appointed to study the application on implementation  of Case Flow Management system in India, and in response, ‘Case  Flow Management Rules for High Courts and Subordinate Courts’ were meticulously crafted. These guidelines mirrored the suggestions  outlined in the ‘National Mission for Delivery of Justice and Legal  Reform,’ which served as a comprehensive blueprint for judicial  reforms through its strategic initiatives from 2009 to 2012.  Furthermore, the introduction of the Justice A.M. Khanwilkar  Committee on Case Management System aimed to align with these  efforts. On the basis of above recommendation most of the states have  adopted the concept of Case Flow Management and have framed their  own Rules for ensuring timely delivery of justice since 2005.  However, some of the States are yet to frame the rules. We request the  Hon’ble Chief Justices of those High Courts where said Rules are yet  to be framed to take immediate steps to formulate such rules.

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32. Be that as it may, mere framing of the rules would not suffice the problem on hand, until and unless the spirit underlying in the making of the such rules is effectively implemented. The mode,  method and manner in which it requires to be implemented is in the  hands of the respective High Courts. In this regard, although many  High Courts have constituted committees (with different  nomenclature) to monitor the same, the effective implementation  seems to have gone into oblivion. Thus, it would be imperative on the  part of the High Courts to ensure the object with which such  committees were constituted would not remain on paper but are 

implemented in its letter and spirit by constant monitoring, at least by  securing the reports from trial courts through the District Judges once  in two months and keeping a watch and vigil particularly, over the old  cases. Such Committees should focus their attention through  monitoring efforts so as to keep a check on matters being adjourned  for no justifiable reason. When such exercise is carried out with utmost  dedication, it would necessarily yield positive results. Therefore, both  the existing committees and any yet-to-be-constituted Committees by  the respective High Courts should make all endeavours to achieve  the object of making such rules. The Hon’ble Chief Justices of the

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High Courts are requested to activate these Committees and ensure the  implementation of the rules. It is in this background, with utmost  concern the observations were made in the Chief Justice’s Conference,  2016 towards strengthening Case Flow Management Rules for the  purposes of not only reducing arrears but also for ensuring speedy trial.  

Numbers speak more than words: A closer look to the Statistics  of the National Judicial Data Grid 

33. One of the gravest Administrative and structural delay in  litigation in whole, appears to be because of judicial delay. According  to National Judicial Data Grid, the figures available for the  contribution of judicial delay in pendency of cases is alarming. The  State-wise pendency of cases before the respective High Courts and  overall Civil Courts as on 16.10.2023 are as under:

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43

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34. Further, according to National Judicial Data Grid, if we  consider the stage-wise pendency, it is revealed that majority of the  pendency in cases is at the Evidence/ Argument/ Judgement stage  (43,22,478), within which the maximum pendency is caused at the  stage of hearing and evidence. High pendency is also caused during  the Appearance/Service stage (27,03,493), within which the  maximum pendency is appearance and service/summons related. The  reasons behind the maximum pendency as stated by the NJDC has  been ruled to be matters which are stayed (9,69,262) unattended  (8,31,076) and awaiting records (8,219,929).  

35. It is important to acknowledge that while striving for the oft cited goal of expeditious justice, courts, litigants, staff, and lawyers 

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may encounter some level of inconvenience. However, this  inconvenience should take a backseat in light of the Fundamental  Duties enshrined in the Constitution, specifically Article 51A(j) which  obligates every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of  individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to  higher levels of endeavour and achievement. Article 51A is to be  understood to be in a positive form with a view to strive towards  excellence. The people should not conduct themselves so as to enable  anyone to point fingers at them or blame them. “Excellence” means  honest performance. It is the vision of the founder of constitution  makers that citizens of this great country India that is Bharat, should  discharge duties in an exemplary manner rather than perform half heartedly. The duties envisaged under Article 51A are obligatory on  citizens. No doubt the fundamental duties cannot be enforced by Writs and it is in this background it has to be understood that the duties which  are required to be performed by the citizens in general and particularly by the stakeholders of judicial dispensation system should ensure that  they do discharge the obligations prescribed under the law in an  exemplified manner and not blame worthy.

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36. In the hallowed halls of justice, where the rights and liberties  of every citizen are protected, we find ourselves at a critical juncture.  Our Judiciary, the cornerstone of our democratic system, stands as the  beacon of hope for those who seek remedy. Yet, it is a solemn truth that  we must confront with unwavering resolve—the spectre of delay and  pendency has cast a long shadow upon the very dispensation of justice.  In this sacred realm, where the scales of justice are meant to balance  with precision, the backlog of cases and the interminable delays have  reached a disconcerting crescendo. The relentless march of time, while  it may heal wounds for some, it deepens the chasm of despair for  litigants who await the enforcement of their rights. Hence, It is here, in  the chambers of jurisprudence, that we must heed the clarion call of  reform with unwavering urgency.  

37. It is undisputedly accepted that the significance of a swift and  efficient judiciary cannot be overstated. It is a cornerstone of  democracy, a bulwark against tyranny, and the guarantor of individual  liberties. The voices of the oppressed, the rights of the marginalized,  the claims of the aggrieved—all are rendered hollow when justice is  deferred. Every pending case represents a soul in limbo, waiting for  closure and vindication. Every delay is an affront to the very ideals that 

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underpin our legal system. Sadly, the concept of justice delayed is  justice denied is not a mere truism, but an irrefutable truth.  

Thus, we stand at a crossroads, not of our choosing but of our duty  where the urgency of legal reforms in our judiciary cannot be  overstated, for the pendulum of justice must swing unimpeded. The  edifice of our democracy depends on a judiciary that dispenses justice  not as an afterthought but as a paramount mission. We must adapt, we  must reform, and we must ensure that justice is not a mirage but a  tangible reality for all. 

38. Therefore, in this pursuit, we call upon all stakeholders—the  legal fraternity, the legislature, the executive, and the citizens  themselves—to join hands in a concerted effort to untangle the web of  delay and pendency. We must streamline procedures, bolster  infrastructure, invest in technology, and empower our judiciary to meet  the demands of our time. 

39. The time for procrastination is long past, for justice cannot be a  casualty of bureaucratic inefficiency. We must act now, for the hour is  late, and the call for justice is unwavering. Let us, as guardians of the  law, restore the faith of our citizens in the promise of a just and 

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equitable society. Let us embark on a journey of legal reform with  urgency, for the legacy we leave will shape the destiny of a nation. In  the halls of justice, let not the echoes of delay and pendency drown out  the clarion call of reform. The time is now, and justice waits for no one.  Hence, the following requests to Hon’ble the Chief Justices of the High  Courts are made and directions are issued to the trial courts to ensure  ‘speedy justice’ is delivered. 

RE: POINT NO.3 

For the reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following 

ORDER  

1. Civil Appeal is allowed and the order dated 28.11.2019  passed in Writ Petition (M/S) No.144 of 2013 by High Court of  Uttarakhand at Nainital is set aside and the order dated 09.05.2012  passed by the Trial Court as affirmed in Civil Revision No.4 of 2012  dated 13.12.2012 stands affirmed.  

2. The following directions are issued: 

i. All courts at district and taluka levels shall ensure  

proper execution of the summons and in a time bound  

manner as prescribed under Order V Rule (2) of CPC and 

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same shall be monitored by Principal District Judges and  after collating the statistics they shall forward the same to be  placed before the committee constituted by the High Court for its consideration and monitoring. 

ii. All courts at District and Taluka level shall ensure that  written statement is filed within the prescribed limit namely  as prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 and preferably within  30 days and to assign reasons in writing as to why the time  limit is being extended beyond 30 days as indicated under proviso to sub-Rule (1) of Order VIII of CPC. 

iii. All courts at Districts and Talukas shall ensure after the  pleadings are complete, the parties should be called upon to  appear on the day fixed as indicated in Order X and record  the admissions and denials and the court shall direct the  parties to the suit to opt for either mode of the settlement  outside the court as specified in sub-Section (1) of Section  89 and at the option of the parties shall fix the date of  appearance before such forum or authority and in the event  of the parties opting to any one of the modes of settlement  directions be issued to appear on the date, time and venue  fixed and the parties shall so appear before such  authority/forum without any further notice at such  designated place and time and it shall also be made clear in  the reference order that trial is fixed beyond the period of  two months making it clear that in the event of ADR not  being fruitful, the trial would commence on the next day so  fixed and would proceed on day-to-day basis. 

iv. In the event of the party’s failure to opt for ADR namely  resolution of dispute as prescribed under Section 89(1) the  court should frame the issues for its determination within  one week preferably, in the open court. 

v. Fixing of the date of trial shall be in consultation with  the learned advocates appearing for the parties to enable  them to adjust their calendar. Once the date of trial is fixed,  the trial should proceed accordingly to the extent possible, 

on day-to-day basis. 

vi. Learned trial judges of District and Taluka Courts shall  as far as possible maintain the diary for ensuring that only  such number of cases as can be handled on any given day for  trial and complete the recording of evidence so as to avoid  overcrowding of the cases and as a sequence of it would 

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result in adjournment being sought and thereby preventing  

any inconvenience being caused to the stakeholders. 

vii. The counsels representing the parties may be  

enlightened of the provisions of Order XI and Order XII so  

as to narrow down the scope of dispute and it would be also  

the onerous responsibility of the Bar Associations and Bar  

Councils to have periodical refresher courses and preferably  

by virtual mode. 

viii. The trial courts shall scrupulously, meticulously and  

without fail comply with the provisions of Rule 1 of Order  

XVII and once the trial has commenced it shall be proceeded  

from day to day as contemplated under the proviso to Rule  

(2). 

ix. The courts shall give meaningful effect to the  

provisions for payment of cost for ensuring that no  

adjournment is sought for procrastination of the litigation  

and the opposite party is suitably compensated in the event  

of such adjournment is being granted. 

x. At conclusion of trial the oral arguments shall be heard  

immediately and continuously and judgment be pronounced  

within the period stipulated under Order XX of CPC.  

xi. The statistics relating to the cases pending in each court  

beyond 5 years shall be forwarded by every presiding officer  

to the Principal District Judge once in a month who  

(Principal District Judge/District Judge) shall collate the  

same and forward it to the review committee constituted by  

the respective High Courts for enabling it to take further  

steps. 

xii. The Committee so constituted by the Hon’ble Chief  

Justice of the respective States shall meet at least once in two  

months and direct such corrective measures to be taken by  

concerned court as deemed fit and shall also monitor the old  

cases (preferably which are pending for more than 05 years) 

constantly.  

It is also made clear that further directions for implementation of the  above directions would be issued from time to time, if necessary,

and as may be directed by this Court. 

3. The Secretary General is directed to circulate the copy of this  judgment to the Registrar General of all the High Courts for being  placed before the respective Chief Justices for a consideration and  suitable steps being taken as opined herein above. 

4. We make no order as to costs. 

.……………………….J. 

(S. Ravindra Bhat) 

…………………..……J. 

(Aravind Kumar) 

New Delhi, 

October 20, 2023